Abstract
Illustrations
Also, a little insight on why I chose this topic. In 1996 I worked in the Tanker Airlift Control Center as a channel airlift director. I sat across from two individuals responsible for tasking airlift and air refueling assets. One day an airlift barrel master, directed an airlift mission to a civilian contractor and his tanker counterpart remarked, -I wish I could call a civilian contractor whenever my tasking levels got too high." An idea was born…
Introduction
Simply put, America's National Security Strategy, built on the imperative of world-wide engagement, demands nothing less than the best global transportation system the world has ever known, one capable of projecting U.S. strength and resolve-anywhere, anytime.
-General Charles T. Robertson, JR 1 Our nation's ability to project and sustain military power over vast distances is a basic requirement to the maintenance of deterrence-the first-line of our national security. 2 
General
Charles T. Robertson, commander of United States Transportation Command, stressed the importance of rapid global mobility to our nation's capability to project and sustain military power. 3 Air refueling is a force multiplier that is inherently critical to achieving the rapid global mobility General Robertson described. As a force multiplier, air refueling bridges the gap between the CONUS and the various theaters of operations. This accelerates the deployment cycle and reduces dependency on forward staging bases and host nation support.
While deterrence is the first-line of our national security, the ability to win our nation's wars is the bottom-line of our national security. 4 Air refueling's second role, force enhancement, is critical to winning our nation's wars. As a force enhancer, air refueling extends the range, payload and loiter time of combat and combat support forces which allows fighters and bombers to attack strategic and tactical targets, deep in enemy territory, with greater payloads. It is these two unique capabilities, force multiplication and force enhancement that render air refueling indispensable.
Air refueling capability has dwindled despite its importance to national security. A June 2000 General Accounting Office report on military readiness concluded that the DoD is 19%
short of the air refueling capability required to execute wartime plans. 5 Additionally, AMC's Air
Mobility Strategic Plan 2000 identified two deficiencies directly related to air refueling capabilities. 6 The first was increased depot maintenance cycle time for the aging KC-135 tanker fleet and the second was unknown KC-135 airframe service life. 7 Because of these deficiencies, Air Mobility Command planners predict a need to begin retiring KC-135s in fiscal year 2013.
Currently, there is no replacement tanker on the drawing board or in the budget. This increased loiter time provides a distinct advantage in the head-to-head battle for air superiority.
Information Superiority. Air refueling provides force multiplication for information, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets. The number of ISR assets is extremely limited.
Air refueling increases ISR aircraft loiter time which reduces the number of aircraft required to support an operation. This makes the best use of the ISR assets that are available and ultimately maximizes their ability to accomplish information superiority missions.
Agile Combat Support. A key to agile combat support is a responsive transportation system.
Air refueling provides force multiplication for mobility airlift aircraft. The increased range afforded by air refueling allows airlift aircraft to deploy from the CONUS directly to distant theaters of operations, eliminating the need for time consuming en route stops. Air refueling has demonstrated its importance numerous times throughout history. In June 1948, Strategic Air Command (SAC) stood up the first squadron of KB-29M Superfortress tankers and created an unmatchable force capable of worldwide power projection that was previously unknown. 7 As technology advanced, KB-29s were replaced with KC-97s, and, in 1957, KC-135s began replacing the KC-97s. The KC-135 quickly became the workhorse of America's tanker force and remains so today-44 years after its initial delivery. KC-135s teamed with a growing fleet of B-52s became the backbone of America's nuclear deterrent.
Air Refueling in Action
While tankers were the ultimate force enhancement tool for cold war nuclear deterrence, they have also been actively involved in every humanitarian and combat operation since Vietnam.
Vietnam
While the first combat use of air refueling occurred during the Korean War, Vietnam was the first major combat operation that clearly demonstrated the utility of air refueling. In just over passengers and 6,500 tons of cargo. 13 The Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report clearly details the importance of air refueling to the buildup and execution of the Gulf War.
Air operations without the extensive support of aerial tankers would have changed the character of the war… initial deployments to the theater would have been delayed… all dimensions of the air campaign would have been altered, [including] the number of sorties a day as well as the operating bases used… aerial tankers facilitated the speed and mass of the attacks and provided a margin of safety in air operations… the ability to refuel extensively permitted operations from distant, secure bases and provided a buffer of inestimable worth.
14 In addition to refueling Coalition attack aircraft, tankers refueled the entire array of airborne warning, reconnaissance, targeting, and command and control aircraft that provided 24-hour coverage throughout Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.
Post-Gulf War
Since the Gulf War, air refueling has been used extensively for a wide range of operations. 
Analyzing the Air Refueling Emergency
The Defense Department would need a one-third increase in budget simply to maintain the forces and capability it already has.
-Secretary of the Air Force, F. Whitten Peters As the preceding chart depicts, the current offload capacity is 120 million pounds of fuel per day. Furthermore, it assumes offload capability will increase in 2013 when KC-Xs replace KC135s on a one-for-one basis.
Evaluating Current and Future Air Refueling Capability
The tanker fleet must be able to support the requirements for both fuel offload and aircraft availability. According to a June 2000 General Accounting Office Report on Military Readiness, the KC-135 fleet falls below the required mission capability rates for ensuring execution of wartime plans. In fact, the GAO's findings state that KC-135s maintained a 67% mission capability rate for execution of wartime plans as opposed to the 85% mission capability requirement. 6 While this rate is significantly lower than the requirement, AMC officials claim they could implement management practices to improve mission capability. AMC cited deferring depot maintenance, accelerating aircraft through their final days of depot maintenance, and flying some aircraft with missing or broken parts, which would not affect flight safety but would normally make them not mission capable, as practices that could improve mission capability rates. 7 While these actions would improve the mission capability rates, the duration they could be sustained and the extent to which they would counter the nearly 20% shortfall is not quantified by AMC officials. 8 The following charts depict the GAO's findings: 
Evaluating Force Structure
There are four elements within Air Mobility Command's force structure model that bear examination: force structure determination, the concept of a one-for-one replacement, the timeline for KC-X delivery, and the unknown service life of KC-135s.
Force Structure Determination. Despite the value of tankers to airpower projection and engagement, a rather indirect approach is used to determine the tanker force structure. Air Mobility Command's Strategic Master Plan 2000 highlights the shortfalls of this approach:
The tanker requirements study justified the current tanker force structure and identified significant shortfalls in both aircraft and aircrews. This study was based on the requirement statement found in the FY99-03 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). Unfortunately, the air refueling requirement was omitted from the FY00-05 and FY01-05 DPG. This omission also eliminated the basis used for determining the tanker requirement.
The current FY01-05 DPG directs the Air Force to program -to sustain at least the current air refueling support forces (KC-10 and KC-135 aircraft) through the FYDP (Future Years Defense Plan) period." This document no longer contains an actual -requirement" but a fiscally constrained statement that equals the current capability. Primarily due to a large number of PMAI (Primary Mission Aircraft Inventory) aircraft (547 KC-135s and 59 KC-10s), it is widely assumed that tanker support will be available for all contingencies. However, depending upon the scenarios addressed, previous studies have identified significant capability shortfalls in both aircrews and aircraft. Expectancy, noted that -the number of KC-Xs the Air Force would buy to replace the more than 500 KC-135s is still undetermined." 15 Brigadier General Paul W. Essex, who oversees the USAF airlift and tanker acquisition programs at the Pentagon, is wrestling with the KC-X procurement issue. He believes the KC-X will be more efficient than the KC-135, allowing fewer aircraft to provide a greater amount of offload availability; -a new aircraft would be more efficient and allow for a higher utilization rate, which makes a one-for-one replacement unlikely." Yet, General Essex also recognizes the need for -booms in the air" which drives a large tanker fleet for aircraft availability, -A relatively large number of aircraft would be required because worldwide tanker support couldn't be accommodated with a small fleet." Whitten Peters pointed out, -we have no significant replacement programs on the books for our aging tankers." 18 Given the magnitude of this undertaking, AMC needs to account for the likely contingency that the KC-X will not enter service in FY2013.
Unknown Service Life. Currently the service life of the KC-135 is unknown. AMC's Air Mobility Strategic Plan 2000 points out that the major limiting factor for structural service life of the KC-135 is corrosion. 19 The Pentagon is conducting an economic service life study because previous studies failed to include corrosion as a factor. As a result of this study, AMC may have to accelerate the retirement of the KC-135 fleet and the procurement of the KC-X fleet. 20 Additionally, the current AMC replacement plan counts on the KC-135 continuing service until FY2040. In light of current plans, which indicate half of the tanker force will still be KC-135s in FY2025, AMC's retirement plan will need updating once the valid service life of the KC-135 is established.
Operations Tempo and Crew Manning
The combination of increased operations tempo and the lowest manning authorizations of any major weapon system causes problems for both retention and execution of wartime plans.
At Grand Forks AFB, for example, KC-135 crews are deployed, on the average, 137 days per year. 21 This can aggravate crew retention problems because crews are required to be away from their families for extended periods. Not only do crew manning and operations tempo combine to cause retention problems, they also effect wartime plan execution. According to Lt. Col. Scott
Wilhelm, chief of the modeling branch in the AMC office of studies and analysis, the current KC-135 crew manning will leave the Air Force unprepared to meet wartime demands, -There 
Summarizing the Air Refueling Emergency
The above discussion presents two factors that are critical to understanding the air refueling emergency. First, and foremost, the air refueling shortfall is now! The KC-135 is an extremely old airframe, depot-level maintenance takes over a year, aircraft availability is decreasing and mission capable rates are plummeting. Secondly, the shortfalls in aircraft availability will continue after the KC-X is purchased. In all likelihood, AMC will not receive a one-for-one exchange for KC-135s, nor would the exchange be instantaneous. Therefore, even if the KC-X delivers an increase in efficiencies that leads to greater fuel availability for the deployment phase of operations, it will not solve the aircraft availability issues associated with the employment phase of operations. Furthermore, KC-135s will still account for half the tanker fleet in 2025 and Civilian Contract Air Refueling: Innovative or Insane?
The single greatest power in the world today is the power to change. The most recklessly irresponsible thing we could do in the future would be to go on exactly as we have in the past ten or twenty years.
The most significant oversight in Air Mobility Command's plans for addressing the air refueling emergency is a failure to develop a near-term solution. The shortfall exists today, it will not improve tomorrow, it might get worse before the next generation tanker is delivered, and it is likely the shortfall will not improve entirely after the next generation tanker is delivered.
Secretary of the Air Force, F. Whitten Peters described his concerns:
We have no significant replacement programs on the books for our aging tankers. It is not that we aren't going to have the tankers immediately, but what we are seeing on the KC-135 fleet are what appears to be an increasing mission incapable rate due to technical surprises… These are the kinds of problems which can put a whole fleet down or 200 aircraft down overnight for a period of time and those are the kinds of worries we have. 
Solving the Air Refueling Emergency
In August 1997 USCINCTRANS, General Walter Kross, directed a feasibility study for a Civilian Contract Air Refueling proposal. Unfortunately, the CCAR proposal was limited to contracting for probe and drogue-type refueling only. The feasibility study concluded that a 1% increase in wartime capability would cost approximately $25.5 million annually. 3 Because of the costs associated with a relatively small increase in wartime capability, excitement for the CCAR concept did not exist at USTRANSCOM or AMC. Undoubtedly, the CCAR proposal that USTRANSCOM studied did not present a viable solution to the air refueling shortfalls.
However, it provides four valuable lessons for a CCAR force: CCAR operations are feasible, CCAR operations must be capable of accomplishing boom and probe/drogue-type refuelings, CCAR operations are best suited for deployment and training operations, and CCAR operations are cost effective.
CCAR Feasibility
First, and foremost, the USTRANSCOM report established that CCAR operations are 
CCAR Capability Requirements
CCAR capability must include boom-type refueling capability, not just probe and drogue.
The reasons for this are twofold. First, AMC annual probe and drogue missions do not exceed 2,000 hours. 8 These hours account for a small portion of the nearly 85,000 training hours allocated to tankers and, when divided among the 800 tanker crews, is highly valuable for currency and proficiency. 9 AMC cannot afford to lose a significant portion of this training to a civilian contractor. Secondly, the preponderance of probe and drogue requirements arises during combat strike operations for which CCAR is not suitable. USTRANSCOM's finding, about probe and drogue operations, is valid, -AMC does not have a sufficient amount of peacetime probe and drogue refueling business to sustain a useful contracted A/R fleet."
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CCAR Operations are Cost Effective
The USTRANSCOM report presented initial cost options for CCAR operations that ranged from $4,862 to $9,878 per flying hour and noted that -the figures are not meant to be analyzed from a contract perspective… but rather as benchmarks for report purposes." The importance of air refueling to air power employment cannot be stressed enough, Keith
Hutcheson, in his book Air Mobility: The evolution of Global Reach, records air refueling's contribution masterfully, A robust aerial refueling force provides numerous force multipliers that are critical in today's global environment. It gives virtually "unlimited' range to any air asset (bomber, fighter, airlift, special forces, or rescue) that has aerial refueling capability-U.S. or allied… it gives military leaders tremendous flexibility in both planning and execution. It makes one fighter capable of doing the job of several by increasing the time it can stay aloft and the number of targets it can strike. It permits heavy airlift aircraft to carry greater payloads over much longer distances in significantly less time. An aerial refueling force makes all U.S. military forces (Army, Navy Marine, and Air Force) more influential and more capable. Aerial refueling is an incredible force multiplier.
receiver units a greater opportunity to maintain currency and proficiency at air refueling operations. Finally, CCAR would enhance air refueling flexibility and improve air power employment effectiveness.
CCAR Fills the Gap in Wartime Plan Deficiencies
AMC needs a cost-effective near-term measure to fill the gap in wartime plans and to relieve the peacetime operations tempo. As previously stated, the KC-135's increased depot-level maintenance cycles have decimated peacetime aircraft mission capability rates to nearly 20% below those acceptable for wartime mission accomplishment. 3 Additionally, the service life of the KC-135 is still unknown, operations tempo is at an all-time high and AMC says crew manning is at a level below that required for mission execution. 4 Finally, AMC does not have a plan to fill near-term requirements and, their long-term KC-135 replacement plan ignores the historical and financial realities of garnering a one-for-one replacement for any major weapon system. A CCAR force would help placate these shortcomings.
CCAR Increases Training Opportunities
A CCAR capability serves two roles: force deployment and training enhancement. In its force deployment role, CCAR would be available to relieve air refueling tanker taskings and ensure AMC's ability to execute wartime plans. Additionally, CCAR could be used to relieve tanker taskings during air expeditionary force swap-outs-giving over-tasked tanker crews a relief from the demanding operations tempo. In the training role, CCAR is available to meet receiver air refueling currency and proficiency requirements. 
